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CONSERVATIVE MYTHOLOGY AND THE SUPREME COURT 
Gregg Ivers∗ 
President-elect Donald Trump had little to say about the Supreme Court 
during the presidential campaign season, and what little he did say usually 
focused on the need to protect the Second Amendment and to appoint justices 
who were pro-life, would overturn Roe v. Wade1 and would allow the states to 
take up abortion regulation. Gun owners, Trump claimed, have been “under 
siege by people like Hillary Clinton,” and he pledged to appoint justices who 
would restore and protect their rights. As for abortion rights, Trump repeatedly 
said that “I am pro-life and I will be appointing pro-life judges,” and he would 
prefer the matter to go “back to the individual states.” In the president-elect’s 
own words: 
The justices that I am going to appoint will be pro-life. They will 
have a conservative bent. They will be protecting the second 
amendment. They are great scholars in all cases and they’re people of 
tremendous respect. They will interpret the Constitution the way the 
founders wanted it interpreted and I believe that’s very important. I 
don’t think we should have justices appointed that decide what they 
want to hear. It is all about the Constitution of, and it is so important. 
The Constitution the way it was meant to be. And those are the 
people that I will appoint. 
The model Supreme Court justice for Trump is, not surprisingly, Antonin 
Scalia, who died in February 2016. Throughout his campaign, Trump stated 
that he would appoint justices to the Court—and presumably judges to the 
lower federal courts—“very much in the mold of Justice Scalia.” Trump was 
not the first more recent Republican presidential candidate to hold out Scalia as 
his model justice. In 2012, Mitt Romney pledged in the pages of the 
conservative journal, National Review, that he supported “the reversal of 
Roe v. Wade, because it is bad law and bad medicine. Roe was a misguided 
 
 ∗ Gregg Ivers is Professor of Government in the School of Public Affairs at American University. 
Professor Ivers is author or editor of eight books, including To Build a Wall: American Jews and the 
Separation of Church and State and Constitutional Law: An Introduction. He is a past recipient of the School 
of Public Affairs Excellence in Teaching Award and the Scholar-Teacher of the Year Award. Professor Ivers is 
currently working on a book, Swinging at Jim Crow: How Jazz Became a Civil Rights Movement. He is co-
editor of the Constitutionalism and Democracy Series published by the University of Virginia Press. 
 1 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
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ruling that was a result of a small group of activist federal judges legislating 
from the bench.” Consistent with that view, Romney also stated that he would 
“only appoint justices that adhere to the Constitution and the laws as they are 
written, not as they want them to be written,” and cited Scalia as a role model 
for any potential nominee. Four years before, Republican presidential nominee 
John McCain also touted Justice Scalia as the “type” of justice that he would 
like to appoint to the Court, although he declined to commit to nominate only 
justices pledged to overturn Roe. And George W. Bush, during the 2000 
presidential campaign, also pledged to nominate justices like Scalia. “I have 
great respect for Justice Scalia,” Bush said, “for the strength of his mind, the 
consistency of his convictions, and the judicial philosophy he defends.” On this 
point, President-elect Trump is firmly in line with other recent Republican 
presidential candidates in his public admiration for the recently deceased 
Scalia. Considering his bumpy and often confrontational relationship with the 
Republican Party establishment on almost everything else in the months 
leading up to his stunning victory over Hillary Clinton, Trump’s alignment 
with more recent traditional Republican candidates is remarkable. 
Moreover, Trump’s firm public commitment to overturning Roe and 
appointing “pro-life” justices who will help him achieve that goal, justices who 
support his personal opposition to abortion as a matter of principle, not just 
law, comes like a sudden bolt of lightning on an otherwise pastoral afternoon. 
After eight years of an Obama Administration unabashedly committed to 
reproductive rights and access to birth control and the widely misplaced 
assumption that Hillary Clinton’s certain election would protect the Court for 
at least four more years from a frontal assault on reproductive rights, there was 
little talk about a world without Roe. This was especially true after the Court’s 
5–3 decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt2 in June 2016, which 
invalidated a restrictive Texas abortion law just a few months before the 
presidential season kicked into high gear. Now, should President Trump have 
the opportunity to name an additional justice beyond a replacement for Justice 
Scalia, there will no doubt be a number of states prepared to introduce new 
abortion measures that will return the law to its pre-Roe status. Some states 
might even choose to ban abortion outright, with no exception for rape, incest 
or the health or life of the mother. 
That assumes, of course, that the Court does not rule that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fetus as a person. Such a 
 
 2  136 S.Ct. 2292 (2016).  
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decision is highly unlikely, if not completely implausible. Never mind that no 
current justice on the Court has taken the position that the fetus is a 
constitutional person entitled to protection as a matter of fundamental right, not 
even staunch critics of Roe such as Justices Samuel Alito, Clarence Thomas 
and Chief Justice John Roberts. No justice who has ever served on the Court 
has taken that position. And for good reason. The long-standing argument of 
anti-Roe advocates is that the Constitution does not speak to the question of 
abortion rights, and that responsibility for regulating abortion, in whatever 
context, is the responsibility of the states.3 The goal, of course, is to reduce the 
availability of legal abortion, something that would surely happen should the 
Court return this matter to the states. Congress could also enter the fray, as it 
did in 2003 when it passed the Partial Birth Abortion Act. That law, which the 
Court narrowly upheld in Gonzales v. Carhart4 (2007), gave states far more 
latitude to restrict access to abortion in the late stages of the third trimester, so 
long as it provided an exception for the life of the mother. Holding that the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects the fetus as a constitutional person and 
obligates the state to protect it by criminalizing abortion would keep the issue 
in the courts. That would undermine the position that anti-Roe justices—and, 
presumably, any prospective Trump administration nominee—have taken since 
the case was decided in 1973. 
President-elect Trump’s position that the Second Amendment has been 
under siege by “people like Hillary Clinton” and the Obama administration 
does not hold up to even the barest scrutiny. Currently, every state and the 
District of Columbia permit residents to carry concealed weapons. Forty-two 
states and the District of Columbia require a permit to carry a concealed 
weapon; the eight other states do not require permit. Forty-four states have 
open-carry laws, which permit residents to carry weapons in public places. 
Only three states and the District of Columbia prohibit carrying any firearm in 
public, whether a handgun or a rifle, commonly referred to as “long guns” in 
state law. Three states prohibit residents from carrying a handgun but not a 
long gun, and two states prohibit residents from carrying a long gun but not a 
handgun.5 Further protecting the rights of gun owners has been the Supreme 
Court, which, in two major decisions less than ten years old, District of 
Columbia v. Heller6 and McDonald v. City of Chicago,7 ruled that the Second 
 
 3 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 4 550 U.S. 124 (2007).  
 5 Open Carrying, SMART GUN LAWS, http://smartgunlaws.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/firearms-in-public-
places/open-carrying/. 
 6  554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
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Amendment confers an individual right to own a handgun. But Justice Scalia—
there he is again—writing for a 5–4 Court in Heller, also said that the Second 
Amendment did not protect the “right to keep and carry any weapon 
whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”8 Still, gun 
owners have far more rights and are entitled to far more protection under the 
Second Amendment than they were before President Obama took office in 
January 2009. 
President-elect Trump’s insistence that a liberal Court has stood in the way 
of a return to the pre-Roe abortion rights landscape and barely held the line 
against “people like Hillary Clinton” and presumably any Democratic 
president determined to undermine the Second Amendment parallels, in many 
respects, not just similar criticism from recent Republican candidates. His 
criticism of the Court echoes the rhetoric of Republican presidential candidates 
dating back to Richard Nixon. During the 1968 presidential campaign, Nixon 
emphasized the need to return to “law and order” after the chaotic events of the 
decade had left many Americans at odds with the criminal justice decisions of 
the Earl Warren-led Supreme Court. The Warren Court had dramatically 
expanded the rights of the criminally accused during an era in which the 
nation, by the time of the 1968 presidential campaign between Nixon and 
Democratic nominee Hubert H. Humphrey, was on the verge of a collective 
nervous breakdown. Nixon blamed the Court for creating an environment that 
protected criminals at the expense law enforcement. Appointing justices who 
favored a “strict construction” of the Constitution would be among his highest 
priorities. In 1980, Ronald Reagan, then considered the most conservative 
Republican nominee since Barry Goldwater in 1964, also put the Court in his 
crosshairs during the campaign. Reagan emphasized that the Court had 
unmoored the Constitution from its true meaning, and promised he would 
appoint justices committed to the original intent of the Framers. And that 
meant reversing Roe, revisiting the Court’s decisions prohibiting state-
sponsored religious practices and government funding for parochial schools, 
calling for an end to affirmative action and other measures designed to address 
racial discrimination and rethinking the relationship between the police and 
criminal defendants. His successor, George H.W. Bush, made similar promises 
during the 1988 campaign. Like Reagan, Bush pledged to appoint justices who 
would overturn Roe and carry out the conservative social agenda through the 
courts. 
 
 7  561 U.S. 742 (2010).  
 8  544 U.S. 570 (2008).  
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For almost fifty years, Republican presidential candidates have campaigned 
against the Supreme Court. And the charges are familiar from year to year and 
campaign to campaign. The Court represents the nation’s legal, social and 
cultural elite and not “the people.” A rotating cabal of liberal justices has 
behaved like politicians in robes rather than jurisprudential seekers of truth. 
And that the effect of all this has been to substitute a politically correct 
Constitution for the original one created by the Framers, who would be 
horrified if they knew that the Court had done to the document they so 
carefully crafted. Justice Scalia, the idealized justice of every Republican 
presidential candidate since Ronald Reagan appointed him to the Court in 
1986, often criticized his colleagues on the bench for all the above reasons, 
especially in cases involving abortion rights, marriage equality and sexual 
privacy. Perhaps his most famous and dyspeptic shot at not just the Court but 
entire legal profession came in his Lawrence v. Texas9 dissent, where he 
excoriated the majority for embracing the “law-profession culture that has 
largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda,” which was dedicated to 
“eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to 
homosexual conduct.” Scalia believed the Lawrence majority had made the 
grievous error of taking sides in the “culture war” because “[s]o imbued is the 
Court with the law profession’s anti-homosexual culture that it is seemingly 
unaware that the attitudes of that culture are not obviously ‘mainstream.’” 
Justice Scalia had not even been interred before Senate Majority Leader 
Mitch McConnell (R-KY) announced in February 2016 that the Senate would 
not hold hearings on any nominee that President Barack Obama would 
nominate to fill his vacancy. True to his word, McConnell did not budge from 
his position, leaving the president’s nominee, Merrick Garland, to twist in the 
wind for the better part of nine months before the November 2016 election 
decided his fate. Restoring the Constitution to its true meaning by appointing 
justices who will carry out Scalia’s vision for the Court would seem 
fundamental to Donald Trump’s campaign theme of making America great 
again. The problem, though, for Trump, as it has been for all Republican 
presidents since Richard Nixon, has not been a wrecking crew of liberal 
justices appointed by Democratic presidents taking their cues from a secretive 
network of liberal law professors. Rather, it has been the justices appointed by 
Republican presidents that have erected the barrier to many of the Court’s 
foundational decisions on the Bill of Rights dating back decades, established 
 
 9  539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
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new rights of the sort that so irritated Justice Scalia and taken positions on 
executive and legislative power at odds with conservative constitutionalists. 
______________ 
Since the October 1969 Term, there have never been more than four 
justices appointed by Democratic presidents serving on the Court at one time. 
The last time Democratic appointees were a majority on the Court was during 
the October 1968 Term. Chief Justice Earl Warren, appointed by Republican 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953, resigned at the conclusion of the 
term. President Nixon appointed Warren E. Burger to replace Earl Warren as 
chief justice. Abe Fortas, who President Lyndon Johnson had appointed in 
1965, resigned at the conclusion of that term as well. President Nixon twice 
attempted to fill Fortas’s seat, first nominating federal appeals court judges 
Clement Haynsworth, who was rejected by the Senate, and then Harold 
Carswell, who also failed to win confirmation. In June 1970, Harry Blackmun, 
Nixon’s third choice and a childhood friend of Chief Justice Burger, filled 
Fortas’s seat, which had been vacant for the entire October 1969 Term, leaving 
the Court evenly divided between justices appointed by Republican and 
Democratic presidents. Blackmun’s appointment tipped the balanced to the 
Republicans, and justices appointed by Republican presidents have been in the 
numerical majority ever since then. 
In contrast, Republican presidents were able to appoint ten consecutive 
justices over an uninterrupted twenty-four year period, from 1969–1993, 
reshaping the party and political dynamics on the Supreme Court. Each 
Republican president during that period was able to appoint at least one justice 
to the Court. From 1969–1971, Nixon appointed four justices, Burger, 
Blackmun, Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist. In 1975, Gerald Ford, who 
served only sixteen months, appointed John Paul Stevens. Democrat Jimmy 
Carter did not make an appointment in his one term in office. During his two-
term presidency, Republican Ronald Reagan appointed Sandra Day O’Connor, 
Scalia, Anthony Kennedy and elevated Rehnquist to chief justice. Republican 
George H.W. Bush appointed David Souter and Clarence Thomas during his 
one term in office. In 1993, Bill Clinton appointed Ruth Bader Ginsburg to fill 
the vacancy created by the retirement of Bryon White, whom John F. Kennedy 
had appointed in 1962. That finally ended the twenty-six-year drought by 
Democratic presidents that dated back to 1967, when Johnson appointed 
legendary civil rights lawyer and then-Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall to 
the Court. A year later, Clinton appointed Stephen Breyer to fill Blackmun’s 
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seat. Republican George W. Bush had two appointments, John Roberts and 
Samuel L. Alito, both of which came during his second term, replacing 
Rehnquist and O’Connor, respectively. Bush’s appointment of Roberts to 
replace Rehnquist marked the third consecutive chief justice appointed by a 
Republican president. In fact, the last Democratic president to appoint a chief 
justice was Harry S. Truman, who tapped Fred Vinson in 1946 to replace 
Harlan Fisk Stone, an appointee of Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt. Donald 
Trump’s election in November 2016 ensures that it will be seventy years and 
counting since a Democratic president last appointed a chief justice to the 
Supreme Court. 
After Powell and Rehnquist took their seats within a day of each other in 
January 1972, the party alignment on the Court shifted to seven Republican 
appointed justices and two Democratic appointed justices. From 1972–2009, 
that distribution would remain consistent, even over the course of six 
presidential elections, with the exception of 1991–1993, when the Court 
counted only one Democratic appointed justice, Bryon White, among its 
members. That distribution is even more remarkable when you consider that 
three Democratic presidents, Carter in 1976, Clinton in 1992 and 1996, and 
Barack Obama in 2008, and three Republican presidents, Reagan in 1980 and 
1984, George H.W. Bush in 1988 and George W. Bush in 2000 and 2004, were 
elected during this time. In 2009, Obama appointed Sonia Sotomayor to 
replace David Souter, and a year later, he appointed Elena Kagan to replace 
John Paul Stevens. For the first time since the October 1970 Term there were 
four justices appointed by Democratic presidents serving on the Court. Had 
Merrick Garland been confirmed and been able to join the Court prior to the 
beginning of the October 2016 Term, it would have been the first time in forty-
eight years that the Court would have begun a term with a majority of justices 
appointed by Democratic presidents on the bench. 
_____________ 
By January 1972, after Nixon had remade the Court by appointing four new 
justices in less than three years, there were no shortage of predictions that a 
“Nixon Court” would soon begin an assault on the liberal legacy of the Warren 
Court, particularly those cases that expanded the scope of the Bill of Rights 
and the Fourteenth Amendment. That concern even extended to the New Deal, 
given some of the newer justices’ comments on federalism and the power of 
Congress to regulate the economy. Rehnquist, who, as an assistant attorney 
general in the Nixon Justice Department, had advocated for far less federal 
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intervention on a range of matters, including public school desegregation, 
greater latitude for religion in public life and economic regulation, he believed 
were properly for the states. Lewis Powell, who had been Nixon’s first choice 
to fill the seat that ultimately went to Harry Blackmun, had been commissioned 
by the United States Chamber of Commerce in 1971 to write a confidential 
memo outlining a strategy on how to combat the new economic and 
environmental regulation coming out of Washington. Titled “Attack on the 
American Free Enterprise System,” Powell wrote that “no thoughtful person 
can question that the American economic system is under attack” by powerful 
tide of liberal forces.10 The “Powell Memo,” as the report soon became known, 
encouraged the business community to step up its efforts to shape the public 
debate by identifying and promoting scholars and speakers to get this message 
out. Powell also suggested to the Chamber that it create and fund conservative, 
business-oriented organizations that had the capacity to litigate and contest 
consumer and environmental groups in the courts. Cases do not arrive at the 
steps of the Supreme Court like an orphan in the night. Public interest 
organizations, often supported by well-funded think tanks and specialized law 
firms with clear points of view and representing all points on the political 
spectrum, have a great deal to do with the ebb and flow of Supreme Court 
litigation. The Powell Memo offered a clear blueprint to conservative groups 
who viewed the Burger Court as one that would be hospitable to their interests, 
and contributed greatly to the rise of conservative interest group litigation. 
But not too far into the post-Warren Court era a funny thing happened on 
the way to the predicted constitutional apocalypse. The Court had not only 
refrained from disturbing any landmark precedent. Solid majorities, consisting 
of Republican appointed justices, were actually extending the meaning of the 
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment in politically sensitive areas that 
went far beyond some of the Warren Court’s most controversial decisions. In 
1971, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,11 the Court 
unanimously ruled that federal courts had jurisdiction under Article III to 
create and impose remedies for school districts that had not met the Court’s 
long-standing requirement dating back to Brown v. Board of Education12 to 
eliminate state-imposed racial segregation in public education. And those 
remedies included court-ordered busing and the remedial alternation of 
attendance zones to create racially integrated schools. That same year, a 
 
 10 Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Mr. Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr. (Aug. 23, 1971).  
 11  402 U.S. 1 (1971).  
 12  349 U.S. 294 (1955).  
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unanimous Court, in Lemon v. Kurtzman,13 also held that religious schools 
were ineligible to receive taxpayer funds that would have the effect of 
impermissibly entangle them with the government, further strengthening the 
wall between church and state the Court had established in previous decades. 
And, in Reed v. Reed,14 the Court, for the first time, extended the reach of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit sex 
discrimination, a decision it would reinforce and strengthen over the next 
several decades. 
But by far the most controversial decision of the early Burger Court—and 
one of the Court’s most controversial decisions ever—came in January 1973 
when it ruled, in Roe v. Wade, that the right to privacy established in Griswold 
v. Connecticut15 extended to the right of women to obtain a legal elective 
abortion. Only four states had laws that survived the Court’s sweeping 
decision, including the approximately dozen states that had modified their 
criminal abortion statutes in accord with a model law developed by the 
American Law Institute (ALI) to permit abortion when the mother’s health or 
life was threatened, or when the women was the victim of rape or incest. Of the 
seven justices that formed the majority, five—Burger, Stewart, Brennan, 
Powell and Blackmun, Roe’s author—were Republican appointees. They were 
joined by Marshall and Franklin D. Roosevelt appointee William Douglas, 
who had authored the Court’s majority opinion in Griswold. Dissenting were 
White and Rehnquist, a position they would take until their respective 
departures from the Court. For the nearly two decades, pro-life organizations 
attempted to narrow and, by the 1980s, argue for the outright reversal of Roe. 
On six separate occasions between 1983 and 1992, the Reagan and Bush 
administrations filed amicus curiae briefs asking the Court to overturn Roe. In 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,16 the Bush administration had supported 
Pennsylvania’s decision to use this case to confront Roe squarely. Solicitor 
General Charles Fried, who, appearing as amicus curiae, had asked the Court 
to overturn Roe four years before in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services17 
on behalf of the Reagan administration, took the same position on behalf of the 
new administration. Even Kathyrn Kolbert, the ACLU attorney representing 
Planned Parenthood in Casey, asked the Court to either affirm or discard Roe 
 
 13  403 U.S. 602 (1971).  
 14  401 U.S. 934 (1971).  
 15  381 U.S. 479 (1965).  
 16  505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
 17  492 U.S. 490 (1989).  
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rather than letting it twist in the wind, as it had since the Reagan administration 
had made overturning the landmark decision a priority. 
On the last day of the term, the Court stunned observers who believed, not 
without good reason, that Roe was slated for the constitutional dustbin. A five-
member majority, all of whom were appointed by Republican presidents, 
affirmed the centrality of Roe that protected the right of women, in 
consultation with their physician, to decide whether or not to continue their 
pregnancy. In a remarkable joint opinion, O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter 
expressed their exasperation with the Reagan and Bush administration’s 
continuous effort to overturn Roe. “Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence 
of doubt,”18 began the opinion. “After considering the fundamental 
constitutional questions resolved by Roe, principles of institutional integrity, 
and the rule of stare decisis, we are to conclude that the essential holding of 
Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed.”19 Justice 
Blackmun, the only member of the Roe Court on the bench for Casey, saluted 
his colleagues for their “act of personal courage and constitutional principle.” 
Nineteen years after five Republican appointed justices joined two Democratic 
appointed justices to establish a constitutional right to abortion, an almost 
entirely different Republican majority affirmed that right. And it not so many 
words they sent a clear message to anyone thinking of asking the Court to 
reconsider Roe in the future. 
Stop. 
Fifteen years later, in Gonzales v. Carhart,20 the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the federal Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003, which bars 
late term abortions under certain circumstances. But the Court also ruled seven 
years before in Stenberg v. Carhart21 that states may not restrict late term 
abortions by criminalizing medical procedures used to perform abortions 
during the second trimester of a woman’s pregnancy. And most recently the 
Court, minus Scalia, ruled in Whole Woman’s Health that a Texas law 
regulating where and when physicians could perform abortions placed an 
“undue burden” on women and bore no relationship to maternal health. This 
time, though, the composition of the pro-Roe/Casey majority was very 
different. Kennedy joined the Court’s Clinton and Obama appointees to strike 
 
 18  Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992). 
 19  Id. at 845.  
 20  550 U.S. 124 (2007).  
 21  530 U.S. 914 (2000).  
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down the Texas law. A day after the court’s ruling, it refused to hear appeals 
from Wisconsin and Mississippi to similar laws, which had been invalidated by 
federal appeals courts. Of note was Alito’s dissent, which did not address the 
question of Roe’s constitutional fitness, instead arguing that the Court should 
have never heard the case. Roberts joined but offered no opinion on Roe. Since 
coming the Court in 2005, Roberts has never said a word about revisiting the 
Court’s abortion precedents. 
___________ 
In the thirty-seven-year period between 1971 and 2008, the Court counted 
at least seven Republican justices among its membership. In the thirty-six-year 
period between 1969 and 2005, five different Republican presidents appointed 
twelve different justices to the Court, compared to just two justices appointed 
by the two Democratic presidents elected during this time. Between 1969 and 
1993, Republican presidents appointed ten justices to the Court without a 
Democratic president making an appointment in the interim. Moreover, 
Republican presidents appointed two chief justices, and then a third in 2005. 
That remarkable run notwithstanding, the Court nonetheless moved the law left 
in many key areas. In Regents, University of California v. Bakke,22 a five-
member majority, with Nixon appointee Lewis Powell writing the controlling 
opinion, ruled that public universities could take race into account in their 
admissions decisions, as long as it avoided racial quotas or did not make race 
the sole admissions factor. Despite repeated opposition by the Reagan and both 
Bush administrations to affirmative action, the Court held the line. In Grutter 
v. Bollinger,23 the Court, with O’Connor writing the majority opinion, ruled 
that public universities could continue to consider race in an “individualized 
considerations” in admissions decisions, handing a defeat to the Bush 
administration, which had asked the justices in a friend of the court brief to 
find the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions program 
unconstitutional. Of the five justices forming the Grutter majority, three were 
Republican appointees. O’Connor’s opinion was notable for another reason, as 
it marked the first time she had voted to uphold an affirmative action after 
twenty-two years on the Court. 
Just this past term, a 4–3 Court upheld a University of Texas affirmative 
action program, holding that student body diversity was a compelling state 
interest that warranted the use of race-conscious means to achieve the 
 
 22  438 U.S. 265 (1978).  
 23  539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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university’s stated objective. And who authored the majority opinion? None 
other than Justice Kennedy. Like O’Connor in Grutter, Fisher was the first 
time Kennedy had voted to uphold an affirmative action program in his 
twenty-nine years on the Court. Nine years before, in Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,24 Kennedy was in the 5–4 
majority that struck down voluntary efforts by local school districts to 
desegregate their public schools. Kennedy wrote separately to emphasize that, 
while he agreed with the Court’s judgment, he did not subscribe to Chief 
Justice Roberts’s “all-too-unyielding insistence that race cannot be a factor in 
instances when, in my view, it may be taken into account.”25 In Fisher, 
Kennedy followed the blueprint he laid down in Parents Involved and cast the 
deciding vote to uphold diversity-based affirmative action in higher education. 
On the question of judicial oversight of school desegregation, there is no doubt 
that the Court, beginning in the early 1990s, does not resemble in the slightest 
the Swann Court of 1971. But on affirmative action, the underlying principles 
of which inform much more public policy than just admissions in higher 
education, the law seems secure. And the irony of two Reagan appointees 
providing the crucial support to uphold affirmative action against a sustained 
legal attack that has its roots in the administration that put them on the Court 
should not be lost. 
____________ 
In Romer v. Evans,26 a 6–3 Court ruled that an amendment to the Colorado 
state constitution barring the state or any political subdivision from enacting or 
enforcing any act designed to protect persons from discrimination based on 
“homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or 
relationships” violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court, and was joined by 
O’Connor, Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, putting four Republican 
appointed justices in the majority. Romer marked the first time the Court 
concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment barred a state from discriminating 
on the basis of sexual orientation, Kennedy wrote that “if the constitutional 
conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very 
least mean that a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot 
constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” Furthermore, Kennedy used the 
 
 24  551 U.S. 701 (2007).  
 25 Id. 
 26  517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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word “animus” to describe Colorado’s motive here, holding that the provision 
advanced no legitimate state interest. Forget whether or not Colorado had 
failed to offer a compelling or even important state interest, the requirement a 
state must meet if it uses a racial or sex-based classification in the law. Six 
justices concluded there was nothing even rational about Colorado’s effort to 
exclude gay men and women from the right to seek legal protection under law. 
Foreshadowing his dissent in Lawrence, Scalia wrote that the Court had taken 
sides in the “cultural wars,” and accused the majority of substituting their own 
personal preferences for the right of Coloradans to legislative their own 
conception of sexual morality. 
Scalia might have been stretching it a bit by suggesting that Romer would 
give states a green light to enact laws permitting polygamy—to date, no state 
has done so—but he was right when he observed that Romer put the Court on a 
collision course with Bowers v. Hardwick.27 There, a sharply divided 5–4 
Court upheld a Georgia sodomy law, concluding that the Constitution included 
no “fundamental right to homosexual sodomy” even though the statute applied 
to all persons, not just gay men and women. Romer, Scalia wrote, placed the 
Court’s “prestige” behind the belief that “opposition to homosexuality is as 
reprehensible as racial or religious bias.” “This Court,” he protested, “has no 
business imposing upon all Americans the resolution favored by the elite class 
from which the Members of this institution are selected, pronouncing that 
‘animosity’ toward homosexuality is evil.” 
To Scalia’s great dismay, the Court, just seven years after Romer, 
overturned Bowers when, just seven years later, it ruled that a Texas law 
banning consensual sex between members of the same sex violated the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Writing 
for the 6–3 majority, Kennedy found that Texas had offered “no legitimate 
state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of 
the individual.”28 O’Connor, who had joined the original Bowers majority, 
agreed with the Court that the Texas law was unconstitutional, but declined to 
join the five other justices, including Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, in 
setting aside Bowers. Nonetheless, that still put four Republican appointed 
justices in the majority invalidating the law. And it set up what Scalia correctly 
predicted was a constitutional path to the recognition of same-sex marriage. If 
a state could not prevent its citizens from engaging the political process to 
 
 27  478 U.S. 186 (1986).  
 28 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
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advocate for laws protecting gay men and women from discrimination or 
criminalize consensual sexual relations between adults, regardless of their 
sexual orientation, then all signs pointed to what he called the “judicial 
imposition of homosexual marriage.”29 
By the time the Court decided United States v. Windsor,30 which, by a 5–4 
margin, invalidated the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and 
Obergefell v. Hodges,31 which held that states could not restrict marriage to 
heterosexual couples, the nation’s attitudes towards sexual privacy and same-
sex marriage had changed dramatically. Between Bowers and Lawrence, not 
one state enacted a law restricting either consensual heterosexual or 
homosexual sexual conduct. In fact, a dozen states had either repealed their 
sodomy statutes or had them declared unconstitutional as a matter of state law 
by state supreme courts. Only twelve states had some sort of criminal sodomy 
law in place when Lawrence was decided. By the time the Court decided 
Obergefell, same-sex marriage was legal in 37 states and the District of 
Columbia. With the exception of the Sixth Circuit, which, in November 2014, 
overturned lower court decisions in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee, 
every federal appeals court that had heard a challenge to state marriage laws in 
the time between Windsor and Obergefell had ruled that the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibited states from restricting marriage to heterosexual 
couples. Moreover, according to a May 2016 Pew Research Center report,32 
fifty-seven percent of Americans supported same-sex marriage, as was the case 
shortly before Obergefell was decided. A May 2016 Gallup Poll33 showed 
support for same-sex marriage at sixty-one percent. Both reports noted that 
public support for same-sex marriage had literally doubled from where it stood 
in 2001. Scalia’s nightmarish vision may well have come true, but one can 
hardly argue that Lawrence and Obergefell somehow “judicially imposed” 
rulings at odds with trends in public opinion. Obergfell offered a different 
alignment and distribution of votes on the Court than Lawrence, with Kennedy, 
joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, the only remaining 
Republican appointee in the majority. No one, in 1987, no one would have 
taken the bet that Anthony Kennedy would become forever linked with sexual 
 
 29 Id. at 604. 
 30  133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).  
 31  135 S. Ct. at 2695–96 (2015).  
 32  Pew Research Center, Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW FORUM (May 12, 2016), http://www. 
pewforum.org/2016/05/12/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/. 
 33  Justin McCarthy, Americans’ Support for Gay Marriage Remains High, at 61%, GALLUP (May 19, 
2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/191645/americans-support-gay-marriage-remains-high.aspx. 
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privacy and marriage equality, just as Harry Blackmun became forever 
associated with Roe. But that is exactly what happened. 
______________ 
For sure, constitutional development on the post-Warren Court has not 
been an inexorable march on behalf of social, economic and political 
liberalism. The Court, on multiple occasions, has turned aside challenges to the 
death penalty, most notably in McCleskey v. Kemp34 and Baze v. Rees35 In 
several, low-visibility decisions, the Court’s Republican appointees have made 
it much more difficult for individuals and organizations to meet standing 
requirements to challenge public funds slated for religious schools and 
organizations. Prosecutors and law enforcement have much more discretion to 
gather evidence, obtain confessions and limit defendant’s rights than they did 
during the heyday of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution. On 
three separate occasions, beginning in 1995, the Court has invalidated 
congressional legislation as beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause, 
something it had not done since 1937. Most recently, the Court ruled, in 
National Federation of Businesses v. Sibelius,36 that Congress lacked power 
under the Commerce Clause to enact the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, passed in 2010 without the support of a single Republican in the 
House or the Senate. Instead, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the Taxing 
and Spending Clause authorized Congress to impose a tax on parties who 
refused to purchase health insurance under the program. Justices Ginsburg, 
Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, who joined Roberts’s opinion on the taxing and 
spending argument, believed that the ACA represented a valid exercise of 
congressional commerce power. Even though Roberts was widely praised by 
supporters of Obamacare for his “judicial statesmanship” in National 
Federation of Independent Businesses, his opinion on the Commerce Clause 
put the Obama administration on notice that any future ambitious legislation 
rooted in the Commerce Clause would not receive the traditional deferential 
review afforded to economic regulation. And it is important to note that the 
Court’s Republican appointees succeeded in striking down the law’s provision 
forcing states to expand their contributions to Medicaid or risk losing federal 
funding, an extraordinary departure from its extant federalism jurisprudence. 
 
 34  481 U.S. 279, 319–20 (1987).  
 35  553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008).  
 36  132 S.Ct. 2566, 2608–09 (2012).  
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And there is, of course, more on the conservative side of the constitutional 
ledger. Most notable are the Court’s decisions in Shelby County v. Holder,37 
which, in striking down key provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, has severely constricted the federal government’s power to 
oversee states and localities with long histories of racial discrimination, and 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,38 which held that the First 
Amendment prohibits limits on corporate campaign expenditures. Chief Justice 
Roberts, who wrote for the 5–4 majority in Shelby County, offered an 
alarmingly naïve understanding of the racial dynamics of Southern electoral 
politics. Acknowledging that “voting discrimination still exists; no one doubts 
that,” Roberts nonetheless concluded that conditions under states still covered 
by the law, which Congress had reauthorized on multiple occasions with little 
or no controversy, had improved to the point where substantial federal 
oversight was no longer necessary. The decision’s impact has been 
considerable in the nearly four years since Shelby County was decided, 
encouraging a number of states to enact photo ID laws, close down voter 
registration centers and enact other measures clearly intended to suppress 
minority voters. States most likely to enact photo ID laws and other restrictions 
are those where Republicans control both the governor’s mansion and state 
legislatures and have significant African American populations. Roberts also 
wrote for the 5–4 majority in Citizens United, the consequences of which have 
been enormous for the role of big money in political campaigns. In both 
decisions, Kennedy was back with the Court’s conservatives, although he had 
nothing to say about either case, merely signing on to Roberts’s opinions. 
On the other hand, the Court has left standing many landmark decisions 
that conservatives, through a concerted electoral, legislative and legal attack, 
have wanted to exorcise for nearly fifty years. Criminal defendants are still 
entitled to their Miranda rights; law enforcement, despite numerous and 
carefully carved out exceptions, must still follow the exclusionary rule; public 
schools cannot require their students to pray in school or sponsor religious 
ceremonies on their campuses; states may not executive juveniles and the 
mentally disabled or sentence them to life without parole; states could not 
usurp the federal government’s authority on immigration by enforcing 
contradictory laws of their own; and, in four remarkable decisions between 
2004 and 2008, the Court ruled that presidential power in times of crisis was 
not unlimited. Invoking Justice Robert H. Jackson’s concurring opinion in 
 
 37  133 S.Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).  
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Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer,39 a revolving majority of predominately 
Republican appointees ruled that the Bush administration could suspend the 
writ of habeas corpus for either American citizens or “enemy combatants” 
being held in military prisons simply because it believed the unprecedented 
nature of global terrorism authorized the president to take unprecedented 
measures. In one such case, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,40 a 5–3 majority, which 
included Stevens, Kennedy and Souter along with Ginsburg and Breyer, 
overturned the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals unanimous opinion upholding 
the Bush administration’s position that it had Article II power to establish a 
military commission and that the Geneva Convention did not apply to enemy 
combatants. Roberts was a member of the D.C. Circuit panel that decided 
Hamdan. And the Court has resisted numerous efforts by Congress, states and 
localities to criminalize unpopular speech and expressive conduct, invalidating 
laws that have attempted to punish everything from flag burning and the 
display of Nazi swastikas and burning crosses to sexually explicit material on 
the Internet. And it was the Rehnquist Court that unanimously ruled, in Reno v. 
American Civil Liberties Union (1997), that government regulation of the 
Internet was subject to the same First Amendment analysis that governed any 
treatment of free speech—prior restraint and “content-based” restrictions were 
permissible under only the most compelling of circumstances. 
____________ 
Simply because the Court, for almost fifty years, has resisted the consistent 
and often emphatic desire of Republican presidents and their allies in the 
worlds of law, academia and politics to abandon one landmark decision after 
another does not mean, of course, that it will continue to maintain that posture 
going forward under a Trump administration. Legal academics, political 
scientists, journalists and others who think and write about the Court and the 
social and political context in which it operates often reach for grand theories 
to explain everything from how the justices should interpret the Constitution to 
why it decides cases the way that it does. Some emphasize the law and legal 
norms, as well as theories that inform them, believing that logic and the search 
for objective rules, rather than politics, experience and—wait for it—evolving 
societal standards animate the Court’s institutional behavior and the individual 
decision-making of the justices. Others argue that law, to paraphrase 
Clauswitz, is simply the extension of politics through other means. For a 
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 40  548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006).  
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significant number of others, the truth is somewhere in between. The justices 
are indeed motivated by certain policy preferences and they are conditioned to 
advance those preferences through the language of law and the norms that 
coincide with it. Indeed, no one can seriously argue that the justices are chosen 
based on their academic and professional “qualifications” alone. A good deal 
of thought goes into who gets selected for reasons that have nothing to do with 
where what they made on the LSAT or how young they were when they made 
partner or advanced to a higher political office. Ideological rigor and 
commitment to a president’s agenda drive the appointment process more so 
than ever before. 
There are certain instances, however, when long-established principles, 
whether in the law (the First Amendment protects unpopular speech, and the 
justices’ continued commitment to the marketplace model is about fidelity to a 
higher abstract principle rather than an endorsement of any particular point of 
view) or the Court’s institutional role (absent a clear constitutional error the 
judiciary should defer to the political process on economic regulation and 
protect those rights considered fundamental and beyond the reach of political 
majorities) that supersede a particular ideological agenda. And one should not 
doubt the importance of prestige, both individual and institutional, that can 
lead justices to make decisions that depart from how they might vote if their 
position would not make a difference. Judges, no less than legislators and other 
elected officials, are strategic actors. Certainly, there were other motives in 
play when Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy and David Souter formed 
an alliance in Casey to save Roe from a full-scale, frontal assault from the 
Bush administration. Their plurality opinion struck a tone that was at times 
defensive, not so subtly reminding the Bush and Reagan administrations that, 
while they might have put them on the Court, the justices were not there to do 
their bidding. But the opinion also spoke about the need for the Court to retain 
is “legitimacy.” How the public viewed the Court was directly related to its 
willingness to follow its decisions. If the public believed the Court merely 
responded to the social and political pressures of the day and did not make 
decisions based on principle, its legitimacy would be lost. Legitimacy, 
integrity, law as foundation rather than political expedient—these were 
considerations O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter emphasized throughout the 
opening part of their opinion before they even turned their attention to the 
Pennsylvania law. 
In fact, the O’Connor-Kennedy-Souter opinion offers a perfect example of 
what I call “the burning building theory of constitutional law.” And it goes 
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something like this: Have you ever been in a conversation where you insisted 
that you would go back into a burning apartment building to retrieve your 
favorite things, rescue your family cat, pull the kindly old gentleman who lives 
four doors down from you and always remembers your birthday or to save the 
single grandmother who looks after other kids in the building and listens to 
your personal problems. Of course. We all have. It’s like telling off your boss 
or quitting your job in the mirror and then deciding once you’ve gotten to work 
and also remembered your car note is due that day, today is not the best time. 
Would we actually risk our lives to go back into a burning building to save a 
cat, retrieve some photo albums or rescue two people unrelated to us? The only 
honest answer is we don’t know. Until you are actually faced with a choice that 
has, so far, only been an abstract consideration, you really have no idea what 
you are going to do. I believed then and still do that the burning building 
theory of constitutional law better explains the outcome in Casey than 
anything. Judging is complex. Oliver Wendell Holmes did not write that the 
life of the law was not experience but logic. Rather, he wrote that the life of the 
law was not logic but experience. General propositions do not decide concrete 
cases, and neither does constitutional fundamentalism. 
Should President Trump have the opportunity to appoint two justices over 
the coming years, Chief Justice John Roberts will, more likely than not, find 
himself having to make decisions that are as strategically calculated towards 
maintaining the Court’s institutional prestige, which took some time to return 
after the clear hit it took in Bush v. Gore (2000), a case that surely ranks 
behind few others in terms of its obvious political transparency. Whole 
Woman’s Health is further away from Casey—twenty-four years—than 
Casey—nineteen years—was from Roe. Does Roberts want to be remembered 
as the Chief Justice who presided over the demise of a decision that has been in 
place almost fifty years and enjoys the support of a majority of the American 
public? And what happens if the Court returns the issue to the states, and some 
take the opportunity to enact really restrictive laws or complete bans on 
abortion? Who will go to jail under new criminal abortion statutes beside the 
women who obtain abortions illegally? Their doctors, as co-conspirators? The 
person that drove and accompanied them and perhaps paid for the procedure? 
It would seem so. Often lost in any discussion about Roe’s fate is the degree to 
which Justice Blackmun’s opinion tied the right of women to obtain abortions 
their physicians. Roe was, of course, fundamentally, about the right of women 
to determine their reproductive choices. But it was also about the right of 
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doctors to practice medicine free from state laws that bore no relationship to 
maternal health and were intended instead to obstruct them.41 
Rarely does the discussion reach that point anytime the question of Roe’s 
fate comes within a nautical square mile of the Court. Supreme Court decisions 
do not implement themselves, and about the only guarantee available in a post-
Roe world would be chaos across the board—complete social and political 
chaos. 
John Roberts has said for the record that he does not want to fail, that he 
does not want to leave the Court’s reputation sullied as the result of failed 
leadership and that he understands there are institutional and political 
considerations that inform the Court’s decision-making. He famously remarked 
in his 2005 confirmation hearing that “judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t 
make the rules; they apply them. The role of the umpire and a judge is critical. 
They make sure everybody plays by the rules. But it is a limited role. Nobody 
ever went to a ball game to see an umpire . . . . I will remember that it’s my job 
to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat.” Only someone who never 
played the game or studied baseball very closely could make that statement 
and keep a straight face. The strike zone is what the umpire says it is.42 Yes, 
there is a rulebook definition, but the strike zone varies from pitcher to pitcher 
and from batter to batter. Umpires reward pitchers who hit their spots 
consistency, even if the pitch is just a bit outside the zone. Established 
veterans, especially stars, get more benefit of the doubt from umpires, as do 
batters who have high batting averages and on-base percentages. Rookies and 
other players just breaking into the major leagues have to earn an umpire’s 
respect before they can begin to question his calls.43 
Chief Justice Roberts finds himself in a place that few expected when the 
polls opened on the morning of November 8th, 2016. Since Hillary Clinton 
was the consensus pick to win the election, few people bothered to think much 
about whether a justice “in the mold of Scalia” was in the offing. Rather, the 
conversation was about the opportunity for a Democratic president to achieve 
something that none had done since Lyndon Johnson—have a Court with a 
 
 41  “For an extension discussion of Justice Blackmun’s opinion and how it linked women and their 
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sonsofsamhorn.com/baseball/umpires/the-human-element-umpire-strike-zones/. 
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working majority of Democratic appointed justices. Now, all eyes will be on 
Roberts, and what will happen if Trump manages to appoint two justices eager 
to side with Alito and Thomas. How this scenario unfolds, of course, depends 
entirely on the justices Trump will replace. If Ginsburg, Breyer or even 
Kennedy retires, that opens up far different strategic considerations for Roberts 
than if Trump merely replaces Alito or Thomas or does not get an appointment 
beyond Scalia’s vacant seat. Will Roberts place the Court’s reputation above 
the Republican political agenda, leaving the Trump administration as frustrated 
as his Republican predecessors in persuading the Court to uproot long-standing 
decisions? Or will he allow the Court to unsettle areas of law that will have a 
profound impact on the social and political order? His decision in National 
Federation of Independent Businesses to join the Court’s four Democratic 
appointees to uphold Obamacare offers some evidence that Roberts is not 
immune to the strategic and institutional concerns that come with being chief 
justice. 
No, the burning building theory of constitutional law and judicial decision-
making doesn’t have the elegance of some mathematical model that purports to 
explain how the Court works. But it does offer a partial explanation for how a 
Republican dominated Court has navigated the terrain of constitutional politics 
for the nearly fifty years. Retracting rights is not something the Court does 
easily, if at all. For better or worse, the Constitution’s fate has been in the 
hands of a majority of Republican appointed justices since 1970 and that is not 
about to change anytime soon. How Roberts, who this term will complete the 
sixty-fourth consecutive year of having a Republican appointee in the Court’s 
middle seat, balances the competing forces in front of him will determine 
whether he succeeds on a personal and institutional level, or burns his and the 
Court’s reputation to the ground. 
 
